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The enlargement of the European Union in May 2004 triggered a relatively large and rapid migration inflow into 
Wales which was concentrated into narrow areas and occupations. As this inflow was larger and faster than 
anticipated, it arguably corresponds more closely to an exogenous supply shock than most migration shocks 
studied in the literature. This helps to some extent to circumvent identification issues arising from simultaneity 
bias which usually pose difficulties when estimating the effect of migration inflows on the labour market. We 
found little evidence that the inflow of accession migrants contributed to a fall in wages or a rise in claimant 
unemployment in Wales between 2004 and 2006. In particular, we found no evidence of an adverse impact on 
young, female or low-skilled claimant unemployment and no evidence of an adverse impact on the wages of the 
low-paid. If anything, we found a positive effect on the wages of higher paid workers and some weak evidence 
of a potentially favourable impact on claimant unemployment. 
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The enlargement of the European Union (EU) in May 2004 granted workers from ten 
accession countries free movement within the union. This triggered a relatively large and 
rapid migration inflow into Wales which was concentrated into narrow areas and 
occupations. As Wales has historically experienced both net out-migration of younger 
people and in-migration of older people, inflows of younger workers has been seen as one 
solution to problems caused by an ageing workforce (Drinkwater and Blackaby 2004). 
Thus, the analysis of the effects of the recent accession migration inflow on the Welsh 
labour market provides a particularly interesting case study.  
 Around 16,000 accession migrants joined the Welsh labour market between May 2004 
and May 2006, according to the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS). This migration 
inflow was equivalent to roughly 1% of the Welsh working age population and to roughly 
a third of the Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) claimant unemployment by May 2006. 
Therefore, this migration shock was large enough to have adverse effects on the labour 
market. Coincidently, claimant unemployment rose by roughly 5,000 (or 12%) between 
May 2004 and May 2006.   
The main contribution of this paper is to investigate whether this increase in the 
claimant unemployment was due to the accession migration inflow. More specifically, we 
estimate the effect of the accession inflow on claimant unemployment and on the 
distribution of wages using micro level monthly WRS and JSA data, as well as data from 
the Annual Survey on Hours and Earnings (ASHE) between 2004 and 2006. This new and 
large source of data on migration combined with data on claimant unemployment permits 
disaggregation at fine (district and month) levels and offers invaluable insights into the 
Welsh labour market.  
Given that the paucity of suitable data is one of the main reasons for scarce evidence on 
the effects of migration, this paper helps to fill a gap in the migration literature for Wales 
and the UK, which is very limited (Dustmann et al. 2005 and 2007; Manacorda et al. 2006; 
Lemos and Portes 2008; Drinkwater et al. 2009 are some of the few) – specially so on the 
effects of the recent EU enlargement. Furthermore, this paper helps to inform 
policymaking on the face of further EU enlargement. It is especially opportune, given the 
current heated public debate on migration – and in particular on migration from current and 
future accession countries. 
Another contribution of this paper is that the nature of the accession migration helps to 
some extent to circumvent identification issues arising from simultaneity bias which 1 
 
usually pose difficulties when estimating the effect of migration inflows on the labour 
market. One complicating identification issue is that if natives respond to the migration 
inflow by moving away from a particular area or occupation, then potential adverse effects 
on that labour market may be offset. Another complicating identification issue is that if 
migrants respond to specific demand conditions by self-selecting into particularly booming 
areas or occupations, once again potential adverse effects on that labour market may be 
offset. The nature of the accession migration, however, was such that these responses from 
both natives and migrants might have been sufficiently lagged to allow identification of 
adverse wages and unemployment effects. That is because the accession inflow was 
substantially larger and faster than anticipated (see Dustmann et al. 2003 for forecasts), and 
thus arguably corresponds more closely to an exogenous supply shock than most migration 
shocks studied in the literature.  
We found little evidence that the inflow of accession migrants contributed to a fall in 
wages or a rise in claimant unemployment in Wales between 2004 and 2006. In particular, 
we found no evidence of an adverse impact on young, female or low-skilled claimant 
unemployment and no evidence of an adverse impact on the wages of the low-paid. If 
anything, we found a positive effect on the wages of higher paid workers and some weak 
evidence of a potentially favourable impact on claimant unemployment. Our results are 
robust to a number of specification checks and are in line with other results in the 
literature.
1  
Our results are also in line with standard theory, which predicts adverse wages and/or 
employment effects following a migration inflow that is unbalanced across areas or skills. 
We found evidence that higher paid (complement) workers had larger, positive and 
significant wage increases, whereas lower paid (competing) workers had smaller and 
insignificant wage increases. One interpretation here is that, relative to higher paid 
workers, lower paid workers had less favourable (though not adverse) wage increases. 
Incidentally, more adverse wage effects for lower paid (competing) workers may have 
been potentially mitigated or offset because they were protected by a concurrently 
increasing minimum wage. 
                                            
1 Our results are in line with evidence in the international (mainly US) literature of little or no effect on 
employment and wages (Chiswick 1980; Grossman 1982; Card 1990, 2005 and 2007; Altonji and Card 1991; 
Pischke and Velling 1997; Friedberg 2001; Dustmann et al. 2005 and 2007; Manacorda et al. 2006; Carrasco 
et al. 2008), though in contrast with other evidence of more adverse effects (Borjas 2003 and 2006; Angrist 
and Kugler 2003; Orrenius and Zavodny 2007). As we discuss in Sections 3 and 4, the disagreement in the 
literature is underlined by an ongoing debate on identification issues arising from natives' mobility and 
migrants' self-selection (see for example Chiswick 1991; Borjas 1999; Card 2001). 2 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data. 
In Section 3 we discuss our empirical model of unemployment. In Section 4 we carefully 
discuss our empirical approach and several associated identification issues. In Section 5 we 
discuss our empirical model of wages. In Section 6 we summarise and conclude. 
 
2. Data  
2.1 Sources  
The migration data we use is from the WRS, the unemployment data is from the JSA, 
and the wages data is from the ASHE. We discuss each in turn. 
In order to work in the UK for a month or longer, accession nationals are obliged to 
register on the Home Office administered Worker Registration Scheme (WRS). 
Registration, in addition to being a legal requirement for accession migrants, offers 
incentives such as certain social security benefits (Home Office 2004). As a result, 
compliance is high and we observe all those registered on the WRS. Between May 2004 
and May 2006 [May 2004 and December 2008], around 560,000 [870,000] migrants 
registered, according to the WRS [UK Border Agency]. In Wales, these figures were 
16,000 and 25,000 respectively. The left panel of Figure 1 shows the quarterly inflow 
between May 2004 and December 2008 according to the UK Border Agency.
2 The trend 
shows a seasonal pattern where numbers peak in the summer and plunge in the winter. This 
trend is also observed in the WRS data (see Figure 3). Furthermore, a downwards trend can 
be observed from 2008 onwards.
3 The migrant headcount is relatively small for Wales 
when compared with other parts of the UK (also see Figure 3). This is also illustrated in 
Figure 2, which shows that Wales received a smaller migration inflow relative to its 
working age population than other parts of the UK.  
The WRS data is rich, large, frequent and timely. It records nationality, address, age, 
                                            
2 The Home Office (2006) uses "application date" and the UK Border Agency uses application "approval 
date" to aggregate the data, whereas Gilpin et al. (2006) use "entry date". As the typical migrant enters the 
UK, finds a job, and then applies to the WRS, we use "start of work date" to best capture labour market 
effects and to skew from identification issues associated to using "entry date" or "application date". 
3 In our regression analysis in Sections 3 to 5 we use WRS data from May 2004 to May 2006, whereas in 
some of our descriptive analysis in Section 2 we also use UK Border Agency data from May 2004 to 
December 2008. This is primarily because, although our first request for WRS and JSA monthly micro level 
data was successful in 2007, our second request in 2009 was not. Therefore, to gather a sense of more recent 
descriptive figures we use quarterly UK Border Agency data, which displays lower overall numbers. In 
addition to exploiting the better quality of the WRS data, further arguments for restricting the regression 
analysis to the first two years only are that: in the longer run labour markets adjust (which might dilute 
potentially adverse effects) (Altonji and Card 1991; Dustmann et al. 2005); and in the longer run labour 
markets are hit by other shocks (which makes identification of migration effects more challenging).  3 
 
gender, number of dependents, application date, entry date, start of work date, hourly wage 
rate, hours worked, sector, occupation and industry. Table 1 shows that many WRS 
migrants are young, male, Polish, childless, working full time in low-paid jobs in 
elementary and machine operative occupations and in manufacturing and catering. The 
WRS is only available for migrants from the ten accession countries, as migrants from 
other countries are not required to register. We restrict our sample to eight of those (A8), 
namely: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and 
Slovakia. We exclude Malta and Cyprus, which already had relative access to the EU 
labour market.
4 
In order to claim unemployment benefit, workers are obliged to register on the 
Department for Work and Pensions administered Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) programme. 
Registration is a legal requirement to qualify for the benefit, and therefore compliance is 
full and we observe all those receiving JSA. Between May 2004 and May 2006 [May 2004 
and December 2008], JSA claimant unemployment rose by roughly 96,000 [690,000]. In 
Wales, these figures were 5,000 and 40,000 respectively. Figure 3 shows the monthly JSA 
stock during this period. As before, the trend shows a seasonal pattern during the summer 
and winter. Claimant unemployment was roughly stable in 2005; it increased in 2006, and 
then decreased in 2007, despite a continuous inflow of migrants. It then increased sharply 
from 2008 onwards, which coincides with the current financial crisis. 
The JSA data is large, frequent and timely, and like the WRS, permits disaggregation at 
fine (district and month) levels.
5 This is in contrast with the more widely used Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), where migration analysis below the region and quarter level is not 
feasible due to sample size limitations. Furthermore, the JSA measures claimant 
unemployment, which is directly relevant for policymaking, instead of the more broad ILO 
unemployment. The JSA records address, gender, age, usual and sought occupations, claim 
                                            
4 A caveat with the WRS is that it measures inflows only and thus the associated netflow and stock cannot be 
calculated. That is because the WRS records jobs, not people. Migrants leaving are not counted whereas 
migrants re-entering the UK are double counted. Blanchflower et al. (2007) analyse A8 migration figures 
across several data sources and conclude that a stock of 500,000 migrants by late 2006 is likely to be an 
upper bound (for example, among other reasons, the WRS data shows a high proportion of registrations for 
temporary jobs and few migrants indicating "likely length of stay" over an year). Pollard et al. (2008) and 
Coats (2008) provide similar analysis and conclude that outflow is not zero, in line with evidence on return 
migration (LaLonde and Topel 1997). If outflow is not random, 
n   in Equation 1 could be biased (see 
Section 2.2). Gilpin et al. (2006) provide a detailed discussion on measurement error in the WRS and 
conclude that any associated bias is not too severe. Another caveat with the WRS is that registration is not a 
requirement for the self-employed (who are a minority that already had relative access to the EU labour 
market), which explains the larger number of Polish plumbers in anecdotal evidence.  
5 We use ONS-defined geographical areas: 409 Local Authority Districts, 49 counties and 12 Government 
Regions (ONS 2003) (see Table 1). Wales comprises 22 Unitary Authority Districts (also see Section 4.2). 4 
 
start and end dates. It does not, however, record nationality. Table 1 shows that many JSA 
unemployed are over 35 years old, female and work in low-paid jobs in elementary 
occupation. 
The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), collected by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS), is derived from employers' data and represents 1% of all 
employees, containing around 160,000 responses per tax-year (which runs from April to 
March). Its sample size again permits disaggregation at fine (district and year) levels, in 
contrast with the LFS, as discussed above. It collects, among other variables, address, 
gender, age, hourly pay, hours worked, occupation and industry. Table 1 shows various 
percentiles and the average of the ASHE and WRS hourly wage distributions. Figure 4 
shows both distributions for those earning £7 per hour or below. A striking feature is how 
sizeable the spike at the minimum wage in the WRS distribution is in relation to the spike 
in the ASHE distribution, though caution should be taken here, as ASHE includes WRS 
migrants after 2004. Another striking feature is how remarkably compressed the WRS 
distribution is: over 90% (75%) of migrants earn between £2.00 (£4.00) and £7.00 an hour.  
Finally, we define control variables that describe the natives' population from the LFS, 
collected by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). ("Natives" here and throughout the 
paper include UK born and overseas born nationals who are UK residents.) The LFS is a 
rotating panel survey that interviews around 60,000 households with about 140,000 
respondents every quarter and represents 0.5% of the population. It collects information on 
personal characteristics and labour market variables. Table 1 summarises some variables 
from the LFS between April 2004 and June 2006.  
 
2.2 Descriptive Analysis 
Within Wales, WRS migrants are concentrated in five main districts, as illustrated in 
the right panel of Figure 1: Newport, Cardiff, Carmarthenshire, Wrexham and Flintshire. 
These districts form two clusters of relatively bigger cities bordering England (except for 
Carmarthenshire, which is in West Wales and is predominantly rural) that are historically 
more associated with migration and have a long term trend of out-migration (Drinkwater 
and Blackaby 2004). These clusters are also traditionally linked to manufacturing, though 
the service sector has been growing in Newport and Cardiff. The left panel of Figure 5 
shows that apart from Cardiff, these are not areas of particularly high or low 
unemployment. (Within Cardiff, it is possible that WRS migrants shun away from high or 
low unemployment areas too.)  5 
 
Given the disproportionate numbers of WRS migrants and claimants in Cardiff, and to 
a lesser extent in the other four districts, it is likely that both groups compete for the same 
jobs and therefore two obvious questions arise. The first question is whether migrants 
pushed natives out of their jobs or made it harder for them to go back into jobs in these 
districts. The right panel of Figure 5 shows a continuing inflow of migrants and an upwards 
trend on the number of claimants in these areas. This provides some evidence of an adverse 
association between WRS migration and claimant unemployment in Newport and Cardiff, 
but perhaps less evidence for Carmarthenshire, Wrexham and Flintshire.  
The second question is whether migrants’ inflow depressed wages. Average wages in 
Wales increased by 4% between May 2004 and May 2006, whereas the wages of the low-
paid (at the 5
th and 10
th percentiles of the wage distribution) increased by 4.6% and 3.9%, 
and the wages of higher paid workers (at the 70
th percentile), by 3.1%. This provides little 
evidence that the WRS migrants depressed the wages of the low-paid, relatively to high-
paid, despite being disproportionately concentrated in low-skilled jobs. More generally, 
Table 1 shows that wages grew strongly in the bottom half of the distribution during the 
whole period – this wage growth was stronger in Wales than in the UK. This again 
provides little evidence of an adverse association between WRS migration and wages 
growth in Wales. 
Figure 6 shows that WRS migrants are concentrated in elementary (36%) and machine 
operative (49%) occupations, and in the manufacturing (48%) and the distribution hotels 
and restaurants (23%) sectors (see Table 1).
6 Once again, given the disproportionate 
numbers of WRS migrants and claimants in these occupations, it is likely that both groups 
compete for the same jobs. The obvious question is again whether migrants pushed natives 
out of, or made it harder for them to go back into jobs in these occupations. The left panel 
of Figure 7 shows that despite the continuing inflow of migrants into machine operatives 
occupations, more claimants switched to this from other (usual) occupations.
7 Also, wages 
grew faster in machine operatives between 2005 and 2006 (3.8%) than in elementary 
(2.7%) or other occupations (3.5%) for the whole of the UK. This suggests that demand 
side factors may have driven both migrants and claimants into machine operative jobs.  
The right panel of Figure 7 also shows a continuing inflow of migrants into elementary 
occupations, where they were probably more able to find jobs because of language or other 
labour market barriers (Card and DiNardo 2000; Friedberg 2001; Drinkwater et al. 2009). 
                                            
6 We use the nine Standard Occupation Codes (see Table 1).  
7 We observe both usual and sought occupation for the claimant unemployed, thus overcoming a common 
difficulty in the literature, where occupation is often not observed (Card 2001). 6 
 
This is also the usual occupation for most claimants (34%) and Figure 7 shows that some 
of them switched from looking for jobs in (usual) elementary to other (sought) occupations. 
The switch could be because natives were pushed out of their jobs, which would suggest 
some evidence of an adverse association between WRS migration and claimant 
unemployment in elementary occupations. However, the switch could also be because of 
other factors, including occupational progression, sectoral or occupational shocks, macro 
shocks, etc., which we account for in our empirical models in Sections 3 to 5. An example 
of such shocks, as discussed above, is the claimant unemployment increase across all 
occupations in early 2006, which hints at macro effects in addition to any WRS migration 
effects.  
The top left panel of Figure 8 plots our claimant unemployment (netflow) rate variable 
it N   against our migration (inflow) rate variable  it M   across t months (May 2004 to 
April 2006) and i districts (i districts are replaced with  j  occupations in the top right 
panel of Figure 8). This again provides little evidence of an adverse association between 
the two variables. The raw data suggests that claimant unemployment did not grow faster 
in districts and occupations that received relatively more migrants. The two bottom panels 
of Figure 8 also plot the average (and 10
th percentile) of the distribution of log hourly pay 
iy W  in first-difference across  y  tax-years (2004 to 2006) and i districts against the (April 
to March) yearly migration rate  iy M  . Again, this provides little evidence of an adverse 
association between the two variables. The raw data suggests that wages did not grow 
slower in districts that received relatively more migrants.
8 
In sum, the inflow of WRS migrants in Wales represents a relatively large, rapid and 
concentrated shock into two main occupations and five main districts, with the remainder 
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*
it N  is the number (stock) of JSA claimants, 
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is the number (stock) of WRS migrants, and  it P  is working age population. As discussed in Section 2.1, 




    it it it N N N , we do not observe the stock of migrants. We therefore re-define the netflow of 
migrants as  it it it O I M   
* , where  it I  is inflow and  it O  is outflow of migrants. As we do not observe 
outflow, we again re-define  it it I M  
* , as it is common in the literature (see for example Card 2001; 












it it O I A   
*  , where 
A
it I  is inflow and 
A
it O  is outflow of natives. We also 
run robustness checks where our migration and unemployment variables in Equation 1 were not standardised 
(re-defining 
*
it it N N     and 
*
it it M M    ) and found qualitatively similar results (also see Section 3). 7 
 
occupations and districts offering clear counterfactuals. There is some weak evidence that 
in these main occupations and locations the inflow might be associated with adverse 
unemployment effects, though less evidence that it might be associated with adverse wage 
effects. We exploit the variation in these occupation and location choices across months to 
separately identify the effect of the migration shock from the effect of other supply and 
demand shocks on claimant unemployment and wages in our empirical models, as we 
discuss in Sections 3 to 5. 
  
3. Unemployment Effects  
Using a reduced form equation grounded on standard theory (see for example Borjas 
1999; Card 2001; Dustmann et al. 2005), we estimate the effect of the WRS migration 








it f X M N                                    (1) 
where  it N   and  it M   are our unemployment and migration variables, defined in Section 
2.2,  it X  are labour supply and demand shifters, 
n
t f  is time fixed effects, and 
n
it   is the 
error term in district  22 ,..., 1  i  and month-year  24 ,..., 1  t . The interpretation of our 
coefficient of interest is that a one percentage point increase in the migration rate changes 
the claimant unemployment rate by 
n   percentage points.  
As we estimate Equation 1 in first-difference, district fixed effects were differenced out. 
This enables us to separate the effect of district specific factors, which might make a 
particular district more attractive to migrants or natives or both (such as more schools, 
more housing, higher wages, etc.), from the effect of the WRS shock on claimant 
unemployment. We model time fixed effects using 24 month-year dummies. This enables 
us to separate the effect of other macro shocks (such as seasonal shocks, national and 
international shocks, etc.) from the effect of the WRS shock on claimant unemployment.  
We also control for supply and demand shifters. This enables us to separate the effect of 
supply and demand shocks from the effect of the WRS shock on claimant unemployment. 
Controls in  it X  include the proportion of the total population who are women, young 
(those between 18 and 24 years of age), and ethnic minorities and migrants from outside 
the A8 countries. This enables us to control for higher unemployment in a particular 
district due to the presence of relatively more women, young, minorities or other migrants 
– which are groups who often experience high unemployment. Further controls include the 8 
 
lagged proportion of WRS migrants who are women, young and parents (along with 
average number of children). We also control for the lagged average hours worked by 
WRS migrants to account for potentially higher claimant unemployment in districts where 
migrants work longer hours (which may increase substitutability). We also include the 
lagged proportion of WRS migrants in elementary and machine operative occupations to 
control for occupation-district specific shocks affecting claimant unemployment. Finally, 
we include the lagged proportion of unemployed who are women and young, and lagged 
average claim duration. Lagged claim duration accounts for higher unemployment in 
districts with historically long spells of unemployment; it also alleviates problems arising 
from serial correlation in the residuals and it can be interpreted as a measure of labour 
demand.
9 
We perform a Generalized Least Square (GLS) correction to account for the relative 
importance of each district and for heteroskedasticity arising from aggregation. Also, we 
correct the standard errors for serial correlation across and within districts.
10 Given such 
stringent specifications, and given the clear counterfactuals discussed in Section 2.2, we 
argue that the remaining variation in the claimant unemployment rate is likely due to 
changes in the WRS migration inflow – and this ensures the identification of 
n  . 
Table 2 shows our 
n   estimates. The UK results are borrowed from Lemos and Portes 
(2008) and are provided for comparison and completeness, but the main analysis here 
focuses on the results for Wales. Row 1 of Panel A shows an insignificant -0.115 
(unweighted OLS) 
n   estimate, which corresponds to the raw data in Figure 8. Row 2 
shows an insignificant 0.024 (GLS) estimate when we control for district fixed effects. 
Row 3 shows an insignificant 0.006 estimate when we control for month-year fixed effects. 
Row 4 shows an insignificant 0.012 estimate when we control for other supply and demand 
shocks (which are, in the main, significant and of the expected sign here as well as in the 
remainder models in the paper). These estimates are numerically close to zero and 
statistically indifferent from zero. Thus, our results suggest little evidence of adverse 
                                            
9 As in Gilpin et al. (2006), we experimented with two types of dynamics (lagged migration rate and lagged 
claimant unemployment rate), which, however, did not alter our main result. Although dynamics allow for 
lagged adjustments due to slow responses in employment, migration effects are generally expected to be 
lower in the longer run than in the shorter run (Altonji and Card 1991; Dustmann et al. 2005).  
10 The appropriate weight here is the sample size used to calculate the dependent variable (working age 
population), but our estimates were also robust to using total population as weight instead – which reduces 
concerns of a potential correlation between the weight and the dependent variable affecting the results. (Also, 
as discussed in Section 2.2, we run robustness checks where our unemployment and migration variables were 
not standardised and found qualitatively similar results.) Our estimates were also robust to using, in turn, 
April 2004 working age population and April 2004 total population as time-invariant weight.  9 
 
claimant unemployment effects at the district level. 
 
4. Identification 
4.1  Simultaneity Bias 
Two main sources of endogeneity could be biasing our 
n   estimates in Section 3: 
natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection. On the one hand, potentially more adverse 
effects on a particular district that received a migration inflow might be offset if natives 
avoid competing with migrants by moving away to other districts. On the other hand, 
potentially more adverse effects on a particular district that received a migration inflow 
might be offset if migrants deliberately self-selected into booming districts. Therefore, the 
extent to which any adverse unemployment effects can be identified depends on how 
mobile natives are across districts in response to migration inflows and on how able 
migrants are to self-select into booming districts.  
As the WRS migration shock was substantially larger and faster than anticipated (see 
Dustmann et al. 2003 for forecasts), both natives' and migrants' responses – through, 
respectively, mobility out of and self-selection into specific districts – might have been 
sufficiently lagged to allow identification of adverse labour market effects. That is, the 
WRS inflow arguably corresponds more closely to an exogenous supply shock than most 
migration shocks studied in the literature (also see Card 1990 and 2007; Hunt 1992; 
Carrington and Lima 1996; Friedberg 2001). Because of this, we argue that any 
simultaneity bias is not too severe in our estimates in Section 3.  
One way to check the extent of any such a bias in our estimates is to explicitly control 
for natives' mobility in Equation 1. This allows us to separate the effect of the WRS shock 
on claimant unemployment from the effect of natives moving away from (or refraining to 
move into) a district. In other words, we build, to some extent, a counterfactual of how 
mobile natives would have been in the absence of the migration inflow. Therefore, this 
helps to correct for both natives' mobility (omitted variable) bias and migrants' self 
selection (omitted variable) bias. 
Ideally, we want to use a variable that measures what would have been the observed 
natives' net migration had migrants not arrived. As such a counterfactual is not observable, 
we add two observable proxies to  it X  , in turn. The first proxy is lagged working age 
population growth (Borjas et al. 1997; Borjas 2006) – which incidentally ensures that the 
variation in  it M   that identifies 
n   comes from the numerator (migration inflow) and not 10 
 
from the denominator (working age population) (Borjas 2003). To avoid repeating the 
dependent variable as a regressor, we use lagged working age population growth by 
education group (Dustmann et al. 2005; Borjas 2006).
11 The second proxy is the native 
netflow rate  it A  , defined in Section 2.2.  
Rows 5 and 6 of Panel A of Table 2 show that, controlling for respectively lagged 
working age population growth and native netflow rate does not alter the estimates 
qualitatively: the estimates remain insignificant and are, respectively, 0.024 and 0.017 
(compare with row 4). This offers little evidence that natives' mobility offset potentially 
more adverse claimant unemployment effects.  
 
4.2  Aggregation Level 
Another way to check the extent of any natives' mobility bias in our estimates in 
Sections 3 and 4.1 is to aggregate the data at broader levels. Ideally the level of data 
aggregation should conform to the actual radius of job search for natives competing with 
migrants. However, as the boundaries of the actual radius of job search for natives are an 
empirical matter, we experiment with several levels of aggregation (i.e. several degrees of 
natives' mobility), allowing the search to take place on ever wider labour markets (Borjas 
2006). We start with a Twenty-Two-Way district aggregation, followed by a Seven-Way 
and a Three-Way district aggregation.
12 This allows us to assess whether natives are 
district-bound or whether they are mobile across (nearby) districts. If natives' mobility is 
not exacerbated by the migration inflow, estimates at the three different levels of 
aggregation should not differ much, as we now explain in detail.  
In Sections 3 and 4.1 we assumed that there are 22 closed labour markets in Wales (i.e. 
22 x 24 cells). While districts are unlikely to exactly coincide with local labour markets, 
they may represent a fairly realistic practical radius of job search for the low-skilled. 
Because WRS migrants concentrate in low-paid jobs, they compete with low-skilled 
natives, who are less mobile as moving costs might be prohibitive. This effectively means 
                                            
11 We use three groups: those with a degree or above, those with GCSE or below, and those in between. The 
last was omitted in alternative robustness checks, which did not qualitatively alter the main results. 
12 We start with the 22 Unitary Authorities districts defined by the ONS (2003) (see Section 2.1). We then 
aggregate these 22 districts into 7 areas: North-West Wales (Anglesey, Conwy, Denbighshire and Gwynedd), 
North-East Wales (Flintshire and Wrexham), Mid-West Wales (Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion and 
Pembrokeshire), Mid-East Wales (Powys), South-West Wales (Bridgend, Neath Port Talbot, Swansea and 
Vale of Glamorgan), South Wales (Blaenau Gwent, Caerphilly, Cardiff, Merthyr Tydfil, Newport, Rhondda, 
Cynon, Taff and Torfaen) and South-East Wales (Monmouthshire). We finally aggregate these into 3 areas: 
North Wales, Mid Wales and South Wales. 11 
 
that they compete in a relatively more closed market.
13  
We then allow natives further mobility by assuming that there are seven [and then three] 
independent and closed labour markets in Wales (i.e. 7 [3] x 24 cells). Natives can now 
respond to the WRS inflow by moving or commuting within seven broader labour markets, 
instead of being locked into 22 narrowly defined independent labour markets. The 
underlying assumption is that the Three-Way is realistically a more closed labour market 
than the Seven-Way, which is realistically a more closed labour market than the Twenty-
Two-Way aggregation. Thus, if natives are relatively district-bound, then estimates at the 
three different levels of aggregation should not differ much. That is because the natives' 
mobility bias is larger the greater the degree of natives' mobility (Borjas 2006). Our final 
level of aggregation is the national-occupation level, as we discuss in Section 4.4, which 
scrapes all boundaries allowing natives mobility within a fully closed national labour 
market. 
In contrast with the estimates in Panel A of Table 2, the estimates in Panels B and C 
turn negative, though they are only significant at the broadest level of aggregation in panel 
C. This again suggests little evidence of adverse claimant unemployment effects.  
The estimates are larger the broader the aggregation level, offering, perhaps tentatively, 
some weak evidence that natives' mobility in response to migrants' inflow has a favourable 
(not adverse) effect on unemployment. Nonetheless care should be taken here, as although 
larger estimates might be expected at wider aggregation levels as a result of theoretical 
predictions regarding natives' mobility (Borjas 2003 and 2006), they might also be 
expected as a result of modelling choices (Peri and Sparber 2008). One example is that 
three area dummies do not control for as many area specific shocks as 22 area dummies do, 
which may result in a larger 
n   estimate in panel C than in panel A (or B). Moreover, 
serial correlation is more of a concern in more aggregate data, which again could result in a 
larger 
n   estimate at the broadest level of aggregation in panel C (despite appropriate GLS 
corrections at each level). Another example is that implicit district weights differ across 
aggregation levels. For instance, at the most disaggregate level in panel A, different 
districts in South Wales receive different weights, and each district has a small weight; in 
contrast, at the most aggregate level in panel C, the whole of South Wales is treated as one 
single labour market. This could result in a larger 
n   estimate in panel C, weighed towards 
                                            
13 We use work address for WRS migrants and ASHE workers (to eliminate concerns that they may live in 
one district and work in another) and home address for JSA claimants, who we assume, search for jobs 




4.3   Robustness Checks 
The implicit assumption so far is that all WRS migrants compete with all natives in each 
district, which may not be realistic. This is because the vast majority of WRS migrants do 
not compete with highly skilled natives. We relax this by assuming that WRS migrants are 
only substitutes for low-skilled natives (not for high-skilled) within each district. We also 
experiment with other vulnerable groups, such as female and young natives. Here, the 
assumption is that WRS migrants are only substitutes for female (young) natives within 
each district. 
By restricting our sample to specific demographic groups we further check the 
robustness of our earlier estimates. The idea here is that our earlier estimates are for the 
entire pool of unemployed workers, which might be diluting more adverse effects for low 
wage workers (Altonji and Card 1991). We thus re-estimate Equation 1 for three groups, in 
turn: low-skilled (those in elementary occupations), young (those between 18 and 24 years 
of age) and women. These are workers likely to be competing directly with WRS migrants 
(see Section 2).  
Table 3 shows the associated GLS 
n   estimates. Row 1 shows a significant -0.011 
estimate for low-skilled workers at the district level (compare with the insignificant 0.012 
estimate in row 4 of Panel A of Table 2). This suggests, if anything, a less adverse effect 
for the low-skilled at the district level. The estimate is less negative, but insignificant, 
when allowing low-skilled workers to search for jobs at broader aggregation levels. Row 2 
shows that for young workers the estimates are again most negative at the broadest 
aggregation level, but it is never significant. The same is true for female workers. This 
offers little evidence that migrants are substitutes for low-skilled, young or female natives. 
Thus, our main conclusion from before of little evidence of adverse claimant 
unemployment effects is maintained.  
 
4.4  National and Occupational Level 
Another way to relax the assumption that all WRS migrants compete with all natives is 
to assume that low-skilled (high-skilled) WRS migrants compete with low-skilled (high-
skilled) natives in a national market. That is, we aggregate the data across occupations (i.e. 
9 x 24 cells) and assume that migrants and natives are only substitutes within occupations.  13 
 
Stratification across occupations – as opposed to stratification across districts – is 
fruitful because migrants and natives compete more directly within occupations and 
because bias arising from natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection is less of a concern 
across occupations. Furthermore, unless natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection bias 
manifest in exactly the same way across areas and occupations, aggregation across 
occupations is a further check on the robustness of our earlier estimates. 
On the one hand, since WRS migrants are relatively well educated, yet overwhelmingly 
concentrated into low skilled occupations, this suggests occupational downgrading. This 
happens when language or labour market barriers prevent migrants to immediately self-
select into more favourable occupations (also see Card and DiNardo 2000; Friedberg 
2001). Thus, because the WRS inflow was much larger and faster than anticipated, and 
because it was heavily concentrated into low skilled occupations, concerns about migrants' 
self-selection bias are reduced. On the other hand, since immediate natives' mobility away 
from low skilled occupations is limited because it requires retraining (also see Friedberg 
2001; Borjas 2003), then these occupations constitute a relatively closed market. (Some 
limited mobility here derives from occupational progression, which we control for in our 
regression models.) Thus, because the accession inflow was much larger and faster than 
anticipated, and because it was heavily concentrated into low skilled occupations, concerns 
about natives' mobility bias are also reduced.  
We therefore re-estimate Equation 1 replacing i with  9 ,..., 1  j  to mean occupations 
(see Section 2.2)
14 and re-defining  jt X , due to data limitations, to include the lagged 
proportion of WRS migrants who are women, young and parents (along with average 
number of children); their lagged average hours worked; the lagged proportion of 
unemployed who are women and young; and the lagged average claim duration.  
Table 4 shows the associated GLS 
n   estimates. Rows 1 to 4 show positive but 
insignificant estimates: the most complete specification in row 4 shows a 0.035 
insignificant estimate. Row 4a shows a negative, though insignificant estimate, when 
excluding machine operative occupations, where self-selection bias may be a concern. That 
is because machine operatives may have been hit simultaneously by demand (e.g. booming 
construction industry) and supply shocks (e.g. WRS migration inflow), as discussed in 
Section 2.2.  
Our results again suggest little evidence of adverse claimant unemployment effects. 
                                            
14 Our results here using sought occupation to better capture labour market effects were also robust when we 
used usual occupation instead.  14 
 
This is in contrast with Borjas (2006), where more adverse effects were found at wider 
aggregation levels. Although our results were also successively larger the broader the 
aggregation level in Table 2, they are smaller at the national level in Table 4 – and they are, 
if anything, less (not more) adverse at the broadest aggregation level (see Section 4.1). 
 
4.5  Summary 
We stratified labour markets in various dimensions (across districts, counties, regions, 
occupations) and for several demographic groups (low-skilled, young and female) to test 
alternative assumptions on labour substitutability between migrants and natives. In other 
words, we considered several alternative local labour markets where migrants might be 
affecting natives. That is, we modified, in several alternative ways, our assumptions on 
labour substitutability between migrants and natives. Yet, our estimates were reassuringly 
small and in the main insignificant across a number of specifications, sub-samples and 
estimation methods and were not sensitive to the counterfactual underlying each model.
 15 
Our main conclusion is that there is little evidence that an increase in the WRS 
migration rate adversely affected the claimant unemployment rate in Wales between 2004 
and 2006. Our results are in line with the international literature, where adverse 
employment effects are small. They are also in line with the very limited evidence for the 
UK: Lemos and Portes (2008) reported insignificant claimant unemployment effects when 
estimating comparable models for the UK using the same sample data. Dustmann et al. 
(2005) reported insignificant employment and unemployment effects using LFS data for 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
                                            
15 We argue that any remaining endogeneity bias is not very large. Firstly, the WRS migration inflow was a 
large, rapid, concentrated supply shock resulting mainly from political events. More crucially, the WRS 
inflow was a shock substantially larger and faster than anticipated, and thus more exogenous than most 
shocks studied in the literature. As a result, natives' and migrants' responses might have been sufficiently 
lagged and this reduces concerns of simultaneity bias. Secondly, in the relevant time period, the number of 
WRS migrants eligible and in receipt of JSA is negligible. Furthermore, our variable of interest is JSA 
claimant unemployment, as opposed to broader (ILO) unemployment or employment, and this reduces 
further concerns of simultaneity bias. Thirdly, we used fairly stringent specifications, where we controlled for 
omitted variables (two of which are natives' mobility and migrants' self-selection) to some extent through 
district and month-year fixed effects, supply and demand shifters, lagged working age population growth and 
native netflow rate. Despite controlling for natives' mobility using two alternative proxies, we found little 
evidence of an associated bias. Fourthly, we found little evidence of an associated bias when we allowed 
increased natives' mobility through aggregating the data at successively wider levels. Moreover, our results at 
the national-occupation level, where natives are no longer geographically-bound, showed no evidence of an 
associated bias. Finally, Lemos and Portes (2008) reported little evidence of bias correction when exploiting 
a number of carefully defined instruments using the same sample data on comparable models for the UK. 15 
 
5. Wage Effects 
Using a reduced form equation grounded on standard theory (see for example Borjas 
1999; Card 2001; Dustmann et al. 2005), we now estimate the effect of the WRS migration 








iy f X M W                                   (2) 
where  iy W   and  iy M   are our wage and migration variables, defined in Section 2.2, in 
district 22 ,..., 1  i  and tax-year  3 ,..., 1  y ; 
w
y f  is time fixed effects; 
w
iy   is the error term; 
and  iy X  are labour supply and demand shifters that include the proportion of the total 
population who are women, young, ethnic minorities and migrants from outside the A8 
countries; the lagged proportion of WRS migrants who are women, young and parents 
(along with average number of children). As before, we estimate Equation 2 in first-
difference using GLS and thus district fixed effects were differenced out; time fixed effects 
are now modelled using year dummies. The interpretation of our coefficient of interest is 
that a one percentage point increase in the migration rate changes wages by 
w  %.
16  
Table 5 shows our results across percentiles of the wage distribution. The UK results in 
Row 4a are again borrowed from Lemos and Portes (2008) and are provided for 
comparison and completeness, but the main analysis here focuses on the results for Wales. 
Row 1 of the right-most panel shows a significant 4.214 (unweighted OLS) 
w   estimate, 
which corresponds to the raw data in Figure 8. Controlling for district fixed effects 
produces a 2.745 significant (GLS) estimate, and further controlling for time fixed effects 
produces a 3.140 significant estimate. Finally, controlling for other supply and demand 
shocks produces a 3.378 significant estimate. This suggests that an increase of one 
percentage point in the migration rate raises average wages by 3.4%.  
Table 5 shows that the estimates are mostly insignificant below the 50
th percentile (see 
row 4). The estimates for the 60
th and 70
th percentile are significant in the most complete 
and preferred specifications in row 4. They suggest that an increase of one percentage point 
in the migration rate raises wages in the 60
th (70
th) percentile by 3.9% (5.2%). 
As WRS migrants overwhelmingly concentrate around the 5th and 10th percentiles of 
                                            
16 One limitation here is that wage data is only available at the yearly level, and as a result, such detailed 
analysis as the one for claimant unemployment in Sections 3 and 4 was not possible for wages. It is also 
worth noting that, unlike with the JSA unemployment data, which contained a negligible number of WRS 
migrants, the ASHE wage data contains both natives and WRS migrants, as discussed in Section 2.1 Thus, it 
is possible that simultaneity bias, though potentially not too severe, might be more of a concern in our wage 
models. Our wage estimates were robust, however, when subjected to the same robustness checks to natives' 
mobility (omitted) variable bias as in Section 4.1. 16 
 
the wage distribution, we expected to find more adverse (or less favourable) effects there. 
Our estimates were indeed smaller at the very bottom than higher up the distribution, but 
they were insignificant. An important point here is that the minimum wage was in force 
and increasing throughout the period we study, possibly mitigating or offsetting more 
adverse wage effects for lower paid workers (see Figure 4).
17   
In sum, our main conclusion is that there is little evidence that an increase in the WRS 
migration rate adversely affected wages in Wales between 2004 and 2006. Our estimates 
are in line with some evidence in the international literature, where adverse wage effects 
are small (Grossman 1982; Friedberg 2001; Card 1990 and 2007; Carrasco et al. 2008), 
though they are in contrast with other evidence of more adverse wage effects (Borjas 1999 
and 2006; Angrist and Kugler 2003; Orrenius and Zavodny 2007). They are also in line 
with the limited evidence available for the UK: Lemos and Portes (2008) reported 
insignificant wage effects when estimating comparable models for the UK using the same 
sample data. Using LFS data for the 1980s and 1990s, Dustmann et al. (2005) found no 
evidence of adverse wage effects and hinted that this may be in part because migrants' skill 
distribution resembles that of natives. However, Manacorda et al. (2006) argue that the 
associated relative labour supply change ought to have induced wage effects. Using LFS 
and BHPS data between the 1970s and 2000s they also found no adverse wage effects and 
argue that this is because natives and migrants are imperfect substitutes. They then detected 
some adverse wage effects for earlier migrants. This is in line with findings in Dustmann et 
al. (2007) of negative wage effects at the bottom of the distribution – where migrants are 
more concentrated – and positive effects higher up the distribution, when using LFS data 
for the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The enlargement of the EU in May 2004 triggered a relatively large, rapid and 
concentrated migration inflow into Wales. We described and evaluated the impact of this 
inflow on the Welsh labour market. Accession migrants were overwhelmingly 
concentrated in low-paid low-skilled jobs in elementary occupations and machine operative 
occupations in the manufacturing and catering sectors. They are concentrated mainly in 
                                            
17 Other usual explanations in the literature for insignificant wage and employment effects include factor 
equalisation as well as industry structure and output mix adjustments. Although neither offers a full 
explanation (see for example Card 1990 and 2007; Lewis 2003; Ottaviano and Peri 2006), a fruitful avenue 
for future research is more UK based evidence on both fronts. That would help to understand how the 
internal flows of goods, capital and labour across markets change following migration inflows and how firms 
alter their production function and production mix in response to the relative labour supply shift. 17 
 
cities bordering England – which have been historically more associated with migration – 
such as Newport, Cardiff, Wrexham and Flintshire. 
We found little evidence that the inflow of accession migrants contributed to a fall in 
wages or a rise in claimant unemployment in Wales between 2004 and 2006. In particular, 
we found no evidence of an adverse impact on young, female or low-skilled claimant 
unemployment and no evidence of an adverse impact on the wages of the low-paid. If 
anything, we found a positive effect on the wages of higher paid workers and some weak 
evidence of a potentially favourable impact on claimant unemployment. Our results are 
robust and are in line with other results in the literature. They are also in line with standard 
theory. 
Our unemployment effect estimates were small and in the main insignificant. These 
estimates were reassuringly robust to a number of specification checks and estimation 
methods as well as to several different stratifications of the labour market and to different 
sub-samples of workers. 
Our wage effect estimates were positive, small and insignificant at the very bottom of 
the wage distribution, and were larger higher up, though still insignificant below the 
median. Estimates for higher paid workers were significant. An increase of one percentage 
point in the migration rate raises wages of workers in the 60
th (70
th) percentile of the 
distribution by 3.9% (5.2%), while it raises average wages by 3.4%. 
These results are in line with standard theory, which predicts adverse wages and/or 
employment effects following a migration inflow that is unbalanced across area or skill. As 
the accession migration inflow was large, rapid and not balanced across districts or 
occupations, we expected downward pressure on wages and employment in low-paid low-
skilled jobs in occupations and cities where migrants were concentrated. In particular, we 
expected the wage structure to be affected: competing (complement) workers should have 
lower (higher) wage increases.  
We found evidence that higher paid (complement) workers had larger (positive and 
significant) wage increases, whereas lower paid (competing) workers had smaller (and 
insignificantly different from zero) wage increases. One interpretation here is that, relative 
to higher paid workers, lower paid workers had less favourable (though not adverse) wage 
increases. Incidentally, more adverse wage effects for lower paid (competing) workers may 
have been potentially mitigated or offset because they were protected by a concurrently 
increasing minimum wage. 18 
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Source: Worker Registration Scheme data
Across Wales
migrants inflow from May 2004 to April 2006
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data and UK Border Agency data
Figure 1 - Migration Inflow
    
Figure 2 – Migration Inflow Rate by Regions 
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(%) of working age population
3%  or more   (15)
2.5% or more but less than 3%   (4)
1.5% or more but less than 2.5%  (10)
1%  or more but less than 1.5%   (6)
0.5% or more but less than 1%   (7)
less than 0.5%   (8)
2006
1 Glasgow
2 Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire
3 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire
4 Birmingham and Solihull
5 Black Country
6 Brent, Harrow  and Hillingdon & 
   West London
7 Bridgend and Eastern Valleys
8 Central London
9 Cheshire
10 City and East London
11 Coventry & Warw ickshire
12 Cumbria
13 Derbyshire
14 Devon & Cornw all
15 Dorset & Somerset
16 Essex
17 Forth Valley, Fife & Tayside
18 Gloucestershire & Wiltshire
19 Greater Manchester East & West
20 Greater Manchester Central
21 Greater Mersey
22 Hampshire
23 Highland, Islands & Clyde Coast 
     & Grampian
24 Kent
25 Lambeth, Southw ark and Wandsw orth
26 Lanarkshire & East Dunbartonshire
27 Lancashire
28 Leicestershire & Northamptonshire
29 Lincolnshire
30 Liverpool & Wirral
31 Norfolk
32 North & North East London
33 North West Wales & Wrexham
34 North Yorkshire & Humber
35 Northumbria & Gateshead
36 Nottinghamshire
37 South East Wales Cardiff & Vale
38 South & South East London
39 South Tyne ,City of Sunderland & Durham
40 South Yorkshire
41 Staffordshire
42 Suffolk & Cambridgeshire
43 Surrey & Sussex
44 Sw ansea Bay & West Wales
45 Tees Valley
46 The Marches
47 West of England
48 West Yorkshire
49 Ayrshire, Dumfries, Gallow ay & Inverclyde
50 Edinburgh, Lothian & Borders 
Orkney & Shetland Islands



























































































































































































































































migrants inflow (WRS data)
























































































































































migrants inflow (WRS data)
migrants inflow (UKBA data monthly average)
Wales
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data, UK Border Agency data and Jobbseeker's Allowance data
Figure 3 - Migration Inflow and Claimant Unemployment




















































note: ASHE does include WRS migrants
comprises 90% of WRS migrants and 30% of ASHE native workers




















































































note: ASHE does include WRS migrants
   
Natives at or below £7
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data and Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings data
Figure 4 - UK Hourly Wage Distributions


































































































































































































































































































migrants inflow from May 2004 to April 2006 (monthly average)















































































































































































































native claimants in Newport and Cardiff
native claimants in Carmarthenshire
native claimants in Wrexham and Flintshire
migrants inflow into Newport and Cardiff
migrants inflow into Carmarthenshire
migrants inflow into Wrexham and Flintshire
Newport, Cardiff, Carmarthenshire, Wreham and Flintshire
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data and Jobbseeker's Allowance data
Figure 5 - Migration Inflow and Claimant Unemployment


























































































































































migrants inflow into the UK











































































































































































relative migrants inflow into Wales
relative migrants inflow in machine operative occupations into Wales
relative migrants inflow in elementary occupations into Wales
Machine Operative and Elementary Occupations
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data
Figure 6 - Migration Inflow



















































































































































































































native claimants stock by usual occupation in Wales
native claimants stock by sought occupation in Wales


















































































































































































































native claimants stock by usual occupation in Wales
native claimants stock by sought occupation in Wales
migrants inflow in Wales
Elementary Occupations
Figure 7 - Migration Inflow and Claimant Unemployment
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data and Jobbseeker's Allowance data
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migrants inflow as a % of the working age population (wap)
 
occupation and month level
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migrants inflow as a % of the working age population (wap)
 
district and year level
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migrants inflow as a % of the working age population (wap)
 
district and year level
Migration Rate and Wage Growth Rate in Wales
Figure 8 - Migration Rate, Claimant Unemployment Rate and Wage Growth
Source: Worker Registration Scheme data, Jobbseeker's Allowance data and Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings data
    
Table 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS                                                            
VARIABLES WRS JSA ASHE LFS
May 2004 - May 2006 May 2004 - May 2006 May 2004 - May 2006 April 2004 - June 2006
migrants claimants workers UK born Overseas born
I - POPULATION VARIABLES - % of those who are: UK Wales UK Wales
Aged:
under 16 years old 0.00 0.00 - - na na 0.21 0.08
16 to 24 years old 0.37 0.37 0.30 0.35 na na 0.12 0.11
25 to 34 years old 0.45 0.43 0.24 0.23 na na 0.12 0.24
35 to 64 years old 0.18 0.21 0.45 0.41 na na 0.40 0.44
over 65 years old 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 na na 0.16 0.13
Women 0.43 0.38 0.74 0.76 na na 0.51 0.52
Parents (with dependent children) 0.06 0.06 na na na na 0.27 0.32
Blacks - - na na na na 0.01 0.12
Asians - - na na na na 0.02 0.25
Nationality:
Polish 0.61 0.67 na na na na - 0.02
Lithuanian 0.12 0.08 na na na na - 0.01
Slovakian 0.10 0.13 na na na na - 0.00
Lativian 0.07 0.03 na na na na - 0.00
Located in:
London 0.17 - 0.19 - na na 0.09 0.41
South East 0.14 - 0.08 - na na 0.14 0.13
East of England 0.12 - 0.07 - na na 0.09 0.08
East Midlands 0.09 - 0.06 - na na 0.07 0.05
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.08 - 0.09 - na na 0.09 0.06
West Midlands 0.08 - 0.11 - na na 0.09 0.07
North West 0.08 - 0.12 - na na 0.12 0.07
South West 0.08 - 0.05 - na na 0.09 0.05
Scotland 0.08 - 0.10 - na na 0.09 0.04
Northern Ireland 0.04 - 0.03 - na na 0.03 0.01
Wales 0.03 - 0.05 - na na 0.05 0.02
North East 0.01 - 0.05 - na na 0.05 0.02
II - LABOUR MARKET VARIABLES - % of those who are in:
Occupations:
elementary occupations 0.46 0.36 0.35 0.34 na na 0.11 0.14
machine operatives occupations 0.32 0.49 0.10 0.14 na na 0.08 0.07
skilled trades occupations 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.12 na na 0.12 0.08
personal services occupations 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 na na 0.08 0.08
unknown occupation  0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 na na 0.00 0.00
sales and customer service occupations 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.12 na na 0.08 0.07
administrative occupations 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.10 na na 0.13 0.09
professional occupations 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 na na 0.12 0.17
managers and senior officials 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 na na 0.15 0.15
technical occupations 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 na na 0.14 0.15
Sectors:
manufacturing 0.31 0.48 na na na na 0.13 0.11
distribution, hotels & restaurants 0.27 0.23 na na na na 0.19 0.21
transport & communication 0.09 0.07 na na na na 0.07 0.08
agriculture and Fishing 0.08 0.02 na na na na 0.01 0.01
banking, finance & insurance etc 0.08 0.06 na na na na 0.15 0.19
public admin, educ & health 0.06 0.06 na na na na 0.28 0.28
construction 0.04 0.03 na na na na 0.08 0.05
other services 0.02 0.02 na na na na 0.06 0.06
energy and water 0.00 0.00 na na na na 0.01 0.01
Part time 0.08 0.05 na na na na 0.26 0.22
Employment rate - - - - na na 0.76 0.67
Unemployment rate - - - - na na 0.05 0.07
Average claim duration -- 31.32 29.83 na na - -
Looking for a job in their usual occupation -- 0.84 0.87 na na - -
Average hours worked 37.83 38.77 - - na na 36.87 38.37
2004 2006 April 2004 - March 2006
5th percentile hourly wage distribution 4.50 4.50 - - 4.77 5.16 4.50 4.61
10th percentile hourly wage distribution 4.65 4.69 - - 5.14 5.55 5.30 5.18
20th percentile hourly wage distribution 4.85 4.85 - - 5.99 6.45 6.32 6.25
30th percentile hourly wage distribution 4.87 4.85 - - 6.92 7.45 7.27 7.45
40th percentile hourly wage distribution 5.00 5.00 - - 7.95 8.55 8.26 8.61
50th percentile hourly wage distribution 5.05 5.05 - - 9.18 9.89 9.40 9.89
60th percentile hourly wage distribution 5.20 5.05 - - 10.75 11.63 10.87 11.54
70th percentile hourly wage distribution 5.50 5.20 - - 12.80 13.89 12.66 13.57
80th percentile hourly wage distribution 6.00 5.50 - - 15.56 16.92 15.18 16.56
90th percentile hourly wage distribution 6.73 6.20 - - 20.47 22.29 19.24 21.63
Average hourly wage distribution 5.56 5.32 - - 12.04 13.09 11.31 12.18
Standard deviation hourly wage distribution 2.03 1.66 - - na na 6.96 8.10
Adult minimum wage 4.80 4.80 - - 4.50 5.05 4.80 4.80
number of observations 562830 16137 22016120 1039123 21915 23725 201294305 21169990
Source: Worker Registration   Scheme data, Jobseeker 's  All ow a nc e  data, Annu al Survey of Hours and Earnings and Labour Force Sur v e y
(1) Va riables n ot ava ila ble or not  de fined  in a particular d ata set are indicated  b y "na" or "-".  Fo r example, the employment and  un employmen t rates are  not de finied  fo r the  WRS  ASHE o r JSA, where all individuals  are  workin g/unemployed.  
Th e p ropo rtio n o f parents  fro m  the L FS  is  for 20 06 Q2, where the  hou seh old weight use d is b ase d on 2003  po pulatio n e stima tes as re-we ig hte d h ousehold  da tasets are  yet un available (the other fig ures a re based on 200 7 population estimates). 
(2)  As  ASHE is n ot  ava ila ble a t  the micro level,  we  are unable to compute percentiles fo r  the  pe riod  2004-200 6; we instead rep ort percentiles for 2004 and 2006 directly from the "ASHE tables" available from the ONS. Similarly, standard 
deviation is not available.
(3)  As  detaile d in  the text (see Section 2), the WRS mea sures inflo ws,  wherea s th e JSA and LFS measure stocks.  Therefo re, the  WRS figures are cumulative.
(4) National minimum wage  (adult rate) is:  £4.50  between 1 October 20 03  and 30 September 20 04; £4 .85  between  1 October  2004  an d 30  Sep tember 2005;  £5.05  betwee n 1 October 2005 and 30 Sep tem ber  2006.  
 
    
Table 2 - UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MIGRATION
Models coefficient s. errors
A - Twenty-Two-Way District Aggregation
(1) Raw coefficient -0.115 0.140
(2) Baseline specification 0.024 0.035
(3) Adding time effects  0.006 0.028
(4) Adding demand and supply controls 0.012 0.033
(5) Adding working age population growth 0.024 0.032
(6) Adding native netflow rate 0.017 0.032
     (6a) UK 0.003 0.078
B - Seven-Way District Aggregation
(1) Raw coefficient -0.052 0.261
(2) Baseline specification -0.038 0.173
(3) Adding time effects  0.010 0.104
(4) Adding demand and supply controls -0.068 0.168
(5) Adding working age population growth -0.137 0.214
(6) Adding native netflow rate -0.143 0.219
     (6a) UK 0.057 0.086
C - Three-Way District Aggregation
(1) Raw coefficient -0.227 0.558
(2) Baseline specification -0.465 0.490
(3) Adding time effects  -0.539 0.465
(4) Adding demand and supply controls -1.522 0.739
(5) Adding working age population growth -1.522 0.731
(6) Adding native netflow rate -1.439 0.721
     (6a) UK 0.115 0.106
(a) These are GLS estimates weighted by the sample size used to calculate the dependent variabl e  (except in row 1, where OLS unweighted es timates are shown).
(b) The dependent variabl e  is the claimant unemployment rate and the indep endent variable of interest is the WRS migration rate (see Sections 3 and 4). 
(c) Ti me fi xed effects are modeled with month dummies; area fixed effects are differenced out.  See  Section 3 for discussion on deman d and supply controls.
(d) The interpretation of the coefficient is that a 1 percentage point increase in the WRS migration rate changes the claimant unemployment
      rate by b percentage points.  
(e) The estimates for the UK in row 6a of each panel are borrowed from Lemos and Portes (2008). The number of districts for the UK in  pan el A ro w 6a is 4 09  
      (i.e. 409 x 24 observations), the number of counties for the UK in panel B row 6a is 49 (i.e. 49 x 24 observations) and the number of government regions (one of which is Wales )
      for the UK in panel C row 6a is 12 (i.e. 12 x 24 observations). The number of observations for Wales in each panel is respective ly 22 x 24, 7 x 24 and 3 x 24. 
      Thus, the estimates for Wales in rows 1-6 and the estimates for the  UK in row 6a of each panel are not directly comparabl e, though they follow the same pa tte rn 
      of ever broader aggregation.     
Table 3 - UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MIGRATION (robustness checks)
Models coefficient s errors
A - Twenty-Two-Way District Aggregation
(1) Low Skilled -0.011 0.005
(2) Young -0.024 0.016
(3) Female -0.010 0.008
B - Seven-Way District Aggregation
(1) Low Skilled -0.003 0.056
(2) Young 0.020 0.088
(3) Female -0.023 0.061
C - Three-Way District Aggregation
(1) Low Skilled -0.413 0.256
(2) Young -0.476 0.328
(3) Female -0.398 0.298
(a) Notes as in Table 2.











    
Table 4 - UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MIGRATION (by occupation)
Models coefficient s. errors
(1) Raw coefficient  0.141 0.139
(2) Baseline specification  0.097 0.114
(3) Adding time effects 0.024 0.120
(4) Adding demand and supply controls 0.035 0.064
      (4a) Excluding machine operative occupations -0.327 0.189
      (4b) UK Excluding machine operative occupations -0.049 0.089
(a) Notes as in Table 2, except tha tthe number o f observations is now 9 x 24.  As before, time fixe d effects are modeled with month dummies.  














    
Table 5 - WAGE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION
Models 5th percentile  10th percentile  20th percentile 30th percentile 40th percentile
coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors
Twenty-Two-Way District Aggregation
(1) Raw coefficient 1.271 1.796 0.851 1.419 0.533 1.446 0.850 1.529 2.608 1.713
(2) Baseline specification 1.053 1.226 0.247 1.550 -0.259 1.852 0.261 1.864 1.540 1.989
(3) Adding time effects 1.032 1.467 2.619 2.018 2.382 2.044 3.213 2.011 3.983 2.060
(4) Adding demand and supply controls 1.360 1.429 2.845 2.190 2.410 2.294 3.079 2.181 4.175 2.343
      (4a) UK 0.212 0.190 0.110 0.220 0.162 0.305 0.365 0.239 0.453 0.250
Models 50th percentile 60th percentile 70th percentile 80th percentile 90th percentile Average wage
coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors
(1) Raw coefficient 3.254 1.702 2.437 1.690 4.715 2.059 - - - - 4.214 1.481
(2) Baseline specification 2.128 2.216 1.099 1.881 3.777 1.763 - - - - 2.745 1.463
(3) Adding time effects 4.973 2.602 3.957 1.312 5.486 1.908 - - - - 3.140 1.210
(4) Adding demand and supply controls 5.004 2.735 3.874 1.497 5.222 2.316 - - - - 3.378 1.254
      (4a) UK 0.438 0.307 0.455 0.309 0.460 0.336 0.586 0.410 0.869 1.743 0.246 0.276
(a) Notes as in Table 2, except that the dependent variable is now the average and various percentiles  of the wage di stribution across years and districts, and that the number of observations is now 22 x 3.
(b) Estimates not availabl e are indicated by "-".  This is due to small sample size and/or non-reliabi lity or non-availability of dat a points, as explained in detail in the "ASHE ta bles" available from the ONS.  Even though where estimates for 
      Wales are missing corresponding estimates for the UK are reported, care should be taken as these suffer the same limitation: t hey are based on substantially smaller sample size (missing dat a point s) and are here reported for completeness only. 
(c) The estimates for the UK in row 4a of each panel are borrowed from Lemos and Portes (2008), where the number of districts is 409 (i.e. 409 x 3 observations).  
 
 
 
 
 